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ABSTRACT
As a regionalism initiative, establishment of the ASEAN Community needs plausible 
level of public awareness, good public perception and strong public support from the 
public for its legitimacy. The current paper discusses the opinion among the public 
pertaining to regional economic integration under the ASEAN Economic Community 
initiative in comparison to political-security cooperation under the ASEAN Political 
Security Community in 2015 among educated public in four ASEAN countries, 
namely Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam. The study aims to solicit and 
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compare the current situation of public opinion of these two kinds of liberalisation 
in ASEAN within the context of awareness, perception, and support. The research 
objectives were achieved by means of statistical measures and analyses on the 
opinion among 1,471 Gen Y respondents in these four ASEAN countries gathered 
from a public opinion survey in 2015. The study reveals interesting findings. Firstly, 
it found that the extent of awareness of both APSC and AEC is still weak resulting 
in weak extent of perceived relevancy and benefits as well as weak support for 
APSC and moderate-level support for AEC. Secondly, by comparing the opinion on 
APSC to AEC, the study found that awareness, perception and support for economic 
integration in ASEAN were in fact higher than political security cooperation. Finally, 
some implications of these issues are discussed.
Keywords: ASEAN Community, regionalism, economic integration, political 
cooperation, public opinion
INTRODUCTION
Regional integration, either induced by people’s economic regionalisation and/
or state regionalism initiatives, are perhaps the most notable and consequential 
feature of the international economic and political landscape to take shape in 
many part of the world since the end of the Cold War (Benny et al. 2015a). As 
a worldwide phenomenon of increased interaction between actors (state and 
non-state) in economic, security, political, social and cultural spheres, regional 
integration has emerged in different stages in various parts of the world, with 
its most developed form in the European Union (hereafter, EU).
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (hereafter, ASEAN) has 
been regarded as one of the most successful regional integration initiatives 
among the developing countries (Benny, Tham and Ramli 2015). Since its 
inception in 1967, ASEAN has been considered as successful in maintaining 
political stability and security that has in part contributed towards the rapid 
economic growth of its five founding members during 1960s–1990s. Although 
its initial reasons for establishment was mainly political—to secure the region’s 
peace, stability and development—its aims include the promotion of regional 
economic, social and cultural cooperation among the five founding countries 
of Southeast Asia (Tan 2004: 935).
The Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997 and increasing competition 
for investment flows from a rising China and India had caused ASEAN 
leaders to realign strategies for ASEAN economic integration. Accordingly, 
they adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020 in December 1997 that describe the 
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aspiration of an ASEAN Community as a concert of Southeast Asian nations, 
outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in 
partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies 
to be achieved by the end of 2020. Subsequently, a founding document of the 
ASEAN Community—the Declaration of Bali Concord II—in 2003 declare the 
three pillars consisting of the ASEAN Political Security Community (hereafter, 
APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural 
Community (hereafter, ASCC) as its new goal in regional integration. Later, 
the 12th ASEAN Summit accelerated the deadline of the ASEAN Community 
establishment to 2015. 
The Bali Concord II describes that “APSC is envisaged to bring the 
ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that 
countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at 
large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment, of which members 
shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional 
differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another 
and bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives, while 
keep maintaining the respects for the ASEAN Way enshrined in the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC).” The Declaration also defined the AEC as “the 
realisation of the end-goal of economic integration as outlined in the ASEAN 
Vision 2020, to create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN 
economic region in which there is a free flow of goods, services, investment 
and a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced 
poverty and socio-economic disparities in year 2020.”
In 2007, the lofty goals of the APSC and AEC were translated into action 
when the ASEAN leaders issued the Declaration on the APSC Blueprint as well 
as the AEC Blueprint. The Blueprint is essentially a master plan formulated 
for guiding the achievement of an APSC and AEC by 2015. There is moderate 
progress on the economic integration and political cooperation among ASEAN 
members approaching the declaration of ASEAN Community establishment 
in 2015 (Abdullah and Benny 2013). 
Critics however remain sceptical on ASEAN political and economic 
integration (Abdullah and Benny 2013). On political integration, some well-
known scholars—Acharya (2003), Caballero-Anthony (2008), and Chavez 
(2007)—argue that the development and process of ASEAN Community 
appeared to be elitist and state-centric. On ASEAN economic integration, 
some studies (Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, ERIA 2012; 
Asian Development Bank Institute, ADBI 2012) indicate that there has been 
some success in achieving some of the goals of the Blueprint, economic 
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integration is still very much work in progress or the AEC is still essentially a 
community in the making, when measured against its stated goals. Moreover, 
despite a plethora of summits, meetings, plans and protocols designed both to 
strengthen economic integration in the region, the AEC is essentially a top-
down initiative for establishing a single market and production base (Benny, 
Tham and Ramli 2015). The general public of member countries has never 
been involved in the building process of the ASEAN Community and the AEC 
(Benny and Abdullah 2011; Chavez 2007; Moorthy and Benny 2012a and 
2012b). Thus, there is a huge gap between the states’ elites and the public in 
terms of decision making and the formation of ASEAN Community.
The study strongly argues that establishing regional integration needs 
basic conceptualisation, understanding and support from the public of 
the region. Theories of regional integration have shown that opinions and 
participation among the public would determine the success of such efforts 
(Benny, Ramli and Tham 2014; Abdullah and Benny 2013; Benny and 
Abdullah 2011; Moorthy and Benny 2012a, 2012b, 2013; Collins 2008; 
Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Hewstone 1986; Ortuoste 2008). So far, 
regional integration process in ASEAN lacks public involvement in its process 
(Abdullah and Benny 2013). Furthermore, there is also no comprehensive 
measurement on the support, opinions, or consensus of the public on the 
creation of the ASEAN Community. There is also a notable lack of studies that 
have attempted to capture the voices of the public on an ASEAN Community. 
This is not to mention the absence of studies that compares public knowledge, 
perception and supports for the formation of two of three basic pillars of the 
ASEAN Community, namely the APSC and AEC approaching the date of 
ASEAN Community effective establishment at the end of 2015. 
Having said that, this research aims to compare opinion among the 
public in four countries surveyed (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam) 
pertaining to awareness, perception, and supports for APSC and AEC. 
More specifically, the research aims to: (1) assess the opinion—awareness, 
perception, and supports—of APSC and AEC in the four ASEAN countries; 
and (2) to compare the extent of the opinions towards the two ASEAN 
community pillars. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Assessment on scholarly literatures found no scholarly work comparing 
economic and political regionalism in the ASEAN Community context. Studies 
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on the ASEAN are numerous, but conducted using the elite decision-making 
approach for assessing the establishment processes or the social, political and 
economic challenges of ASEAN (Acharya 2003; Benny, Tham and Ramli 
2015; Hew 2007; Guerrero 2008) as well as the readiness of the business 
sector for the AEC (Abidin et al. 2012; Mugijayani and Kartika 2012). Review 
on the literature found that quite a few studies so far on public opinion on the 
establishment of ASEAN Community (e.g., Abdullah and Benny 2013; Benny 
2014, 2015, 2016a, 2016b; Benny and Abdullah, 2011; Benny, Moorthy, Daud 
and Othman 2015a, 2015b; Benny, Ramli and Tham 2014; Benny, Tham 
and Ramli 2015; Moorthy and Benny 2012a, 2012b, 2013; Siraprapasiri and 
Thalang 2016; Thompson, Thianthai and Thuzar 2016), but only very limited 
number of studies discuss the opinion on AEC or APSC. 
Literature Review found only two studies discussing public opinion 
on AEC. The first article, Public Opinion on the Formation of the ASEAN 
Economic Community: An Exploratory Study in Three ASEAN Countries, 
was written by Benny, Tham and Ramli (2015). It discusses the extent of public 
support, commitment, perceived benefits and aspiration among the public in 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in 2010 and found the differences in level 
of support, commitment and perceived benefits in three countries. However, 
this study is considered limited to the opinion among the public in three Malay 
archipelagic states five years before the effective implementation of AEC, so 
more current research is required to capture the present opinion among the 
public.
The most recent study on AEC was conducted by Benny (2015) who 
writes an article, Is the ASEAN Economic Community Relevant to Gen Y 
Professionals? A Comparative Study on Attitudes and Participation of Young 
Professionals in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam on ASEAN Economic 
Integration, on awareness and perception of relevancy of the AEC among the 
young professionals in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam countries during the 
final year of AEC establishment in 2015. He found that the awareness of the 
AEC among the Gen Y professionals was very weak, but they perceived the 
AEC as highly relevant for them individually and also for their country. The 
study goes further by analysing the influence of awareness on the perception 
and found positive association between the two variables. Comparing to the 
current study, scope of this study is limited on the two variables and only 
involves Gen Y Professionals in three countries as unit of analysis.
Review on literature found only one study discussing the public opinion 
on APSC. The article Regional Public Opinion towards the Formation of 
Political Security Community in Southeast Asia, written by Abdullah and 
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Benny (2013) based on their study in 2013, analyses and compares awareness, 
attitude, perception and aspiration for the APSC in Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Singapore based on their survey in 2010 and found that public lacked 
awareness, perceived APSC as elitist state-centric agenda, but displayed some 
positive attitudes and supports for APSC.  
Having discusses previous studies, this study is unique because it aims 
to compare and analyse the opinion towards APSC and AEC. Secondly, this 
study also compared the opinion in four ASEAN countries. In this sense, this 
study includes not only two countries that have been involved in previous 




The study used three variables measured by ten Likert indicators that 
underwent a thorough examination in a series of focus group discussions. 
The first variable—the awareness AEC and APSC—examined the extent of 
knowledge of AEC and APSC by using two indicators: knowledge on the 
APSC and knowledge on the AEC. They were adapted from the indicators of 
the 2009/2010 ASEAN public opinion study conducted by Benny, Tham and 
Rashila (2015) as well as the study by Abdullah and Benny (2013). Details of 
questions are exhibited in Appendix 1.
The second variable—perception of APSC—examined the three kinds 
of perception using six indicators, including: (1) perceived importance of 
APSC for their country; (2) perceived importance of APSC to the respondent 
individually; and (3) perceived benefits of APSC on security and peace of 
the region; (4) perceived importance of AEC for their country; (5) perceived 
importance of AEC to the respondent individually; and (6) perceived benefits 
of AEC on the economic development of ASEAN countries. Most indicators 
were inspired from the 2010 ASEAN public opinion study by Benny, Tham and 
Ramli (2015) and Abdullah and Benny (2013) and have undergone a thorough 
examination in a series of focus group discussions. Details of questions are 
exhibited in the Appendix.
The third variable—support for APSC and AEC—was measured using 
two indicators, i.e., support for APSC and support for AEC. The indicator 
was inspired from the 2010 ASEAN public opinion study by Benny, Tham 
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and Ramli (2015), and Abdullah and Benny (2013). Details of questions are 
exhibited in the Appendix.
Data Collection
Quantitative survey was used as the main method for data collection. A set of 
structured self-administered questionnaires were used and translated into four 
national languages—Indonesian, Malay, Thai, and Vietnamese. Questions were 
pilot tested to 30 respondents in each country to satisfy validity and reliability 
requirement as well as to ensure their comprehensibility by respondents. 
The study selected university students as respondents because of 
the complexity of issues of economic liberalisation and political security 
cooperation. Preeceding the survey, focused group discussions with experts 
and policy-makers at the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia suggested that the 
survey should focus on educated public for this complexity reason because it 
is a little bit difficult for general public to answer the questions with authority 
if they don’t understand the issues of regional integration. Purposive quota 
sampling was employed in the surveys in each capital city (Kuala Lumpur, 
Jakarta, Bangkok, and Hanoi) between June and November 2015. In each city, 
the study targeted around 350 respondents between 18 and 30 years old. 
To collect responses from survey respondents, the study assigned group 
of enumerators in each city. The enumerators were selected from campus 
networks in main public and private universities in Malaysia (Universiti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia in the suburb of Kuala Lumpur), Indonesia (University 
of Indonesia and Binus University, Jakarta), Thailand (Thammasat University, 
Bangkok), and Vietnam (Vietnam National University Hanoi). Preceding the 
survey, focus group discussions was conducted with professors or lecturers in 
each city to get their knowledge, insights, and opinions regarding the issues 
under study. 
The method of data collection is as follows. Firstly, researcher formed 
and trained enumerator teams in each city. Enumerator teams directly met 
the respondents in public spaces on university campuses (such as cafeterias, 
libraries, or university corridors) and asked them to fill out the self-administered 
questionnaire. The respondents who were selected in the study should satisfy 
the working status requirement and purposive quota sampling design, that 
includes: (1) level of education (undergraduate and postgraduate @ 50 
percent); (2) gender (male and female @ 50 percent); and (3) professional 
education/working background, including 30 percent from business, banking 
and economics; 30 percent from social science, political sciences and law; 
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30 percent from engineering, technology and science 30 percent; and 10 
percent from others (including education, literatures, arts). 
Data Analysis
The study uses descriptive and inferential statistics to achieve the aims of 
study. To achieve the first research objective, data were analysed using 
univariate analysis statistics such as frequency, percentage, and mean values. 
To simplify descriptive analysis, the frequency distributions of 6-point scales 
were regrouped into two response categories—agree and disagree. 
Mean values are used to interpret the extent of awareness, perception and 
support by using this criteria. As the indicators use 6-scale Likert scale, the value 
between 1 and 3 is considered as negative while it is positive if the mean value 
is between 4 and 6. For awareness variable, the interpretation of mean values 
is as follow: 1 for “strong unawareness”; 2 for “moderate unawareness”; 3 for 
“weak unawareness”; 4 for “weak awareness”; 5 for “moderate awareness”; 
and 6 for “strong awareness.” For perception variable, the interpretation of 
mean values is as follow: 1 for “strong negative perception”; 2 for “moderate 
negative perception”; 3 for “weak negative perception”; 4 for “weak positive 
perception”; 5 for “moderate positive perception”; and 6 for “strong positive 
perception.” Finally, for support variable, the interpretation of mean values is 
as follow: 1 for “strong unsupportive”; 2 for “moderate unsupportive”; 3 for 
“weak unsupportive”; 4 for “weak supportive”; 5 for “moderate supportive”; 
and 6 for “strong supportive.”
In order to find differences between responses in four countries, data in 
four countries were further analysis to compare means for significant difference. 
For this purpose, the study employed One-Way Analysis of Variance (One-
way ANOVA) with Post-Hoc Least Square Difference (LSD) Tests. Secondly, 
to achieve the second objective, the study uses Paired-Samples T-Tests to 
compare the indicators of awareness, perception and support for APSC with 
those for AEC. 
Methodological Limitation
The study acknowledges some methodological limitations. Firstly, the 
measurement of variables that is considered too direct and unsophisticated. 
The study does not assess awareness, perception and support for APSC and 
AEC in their specific characteristics, but in their holistic integration because 
the second purpose of the study is to compare the awareness, perception and 
support for the two types of ASEAN integration. 
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Secondly, the study was conducted in only four out of ten ASEAN 
members. The study only involves public opinion in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Vietnam. The selection of the four countries was justified as: 
(1) they are considered important in ASEAN in terms of territorial size, 
population, and economy; (2) three countries—Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand—are among the five ASEAN founders; and (3) Vietnam is included 
as one of ASEAN newer members. However, given the uniqueness of the other 
six ASEAN countries not involved in the survey, the study does not pretend to 
represent them. 
Finally, the study used convenience quota, non-random sampling to 
select the targeted public in the four cities. However, the choice of the targeted 
public—only those with tertiary education background—was unavoidable 
because of the requirement of critical thinking among the respondent to answer 
the questions. Therefore, the findings from the study cannot be generalised to 
the general public in ASEAN. However, due to large number of respondents 
involved, the results can be used to understand possible trends among the 
educated young public on the issues studied.
Respondents Demography
A number of 1,471 respondents involved in the study consisted of the Gen Y 
respondents who were attending undergraduate and postgraduate schools in 
leading public and private universities, since it was logistically impossible 
(given time and resource constraints) to extend the sample to include the 
general public in the four countries. The survey involved 387 Indonesians, 
374 Malaysians, 350 Thais and 360 Vietnamese. In terms of gender, the 
respondents were almost balanced between male (47 percent) and female (53 
percent). In each country the proportion is somewhat different: 49 percent 
male and 51 percent female in Indonesia and Thailand; 48 percent male and 
52 percent female in Malaysia; and 42 percent male and 58 percent female in 
Vietnam. 
The study targeted those between 18 and 30 years old, and divided them 
into two groups: 18–25 and 26–30. Those between 18 and 25 years old formed 
the majority of respondents in all countries surveyed (74 percent in general: 77 
percent Indonesians, 71 percent Malaysians, 79 percent Thais and 67 percent 
Vietnamese).
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Table 1: Respondent profiles.
 Country
Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Vietnam Overall
Number of respondents 387 374 350 360 1,471
Percentage
Gender
Male 49 48 49 42 47
Female 51 52 51 58 53
Age
18–25 years old 77 71 79 67 74






Diploma 0 2 1 0 1
Bachelor 




degree 48 44 50 33 44
PhD 0 3 0 0 1
Area of study
Business, banking 
and economics 43 24 31 37 34
Social sciences, 




26 31 30 28 29
Others (literature, 
education, etc.) 7 11 9 5 8
Occupational 
background 
Public sector 14 27 20 24 21
Private sector 32 14 13 21 20
Self-employed 7 8 17 5 9
Student 47 51 50 50 49
Due to complicatedness of the questions, the study set higher education as 
requirement to the respondents. Therefore, based on the current education 
level, the respondents have undergraduate (56 percent in general: 52 percent 
Indonesians, 51 percent Malaysians, 50 percent Thais and 67 percent in Vietnam) 
or postgraduate education (44 percent in general: 48 percent Indonesians, 47 
percent Malaysians, 50 percent Thais and  33 percent Vietnamese).
The study has tried its best to differentiate the areas of study background 
of the respondents in the fieldwork. The results of the areas of study are as 
follow: 34 percent respondents have either business, banking, and economy 
education background (43 percent  Indonesians, 24 percent Malaysians, 31 
percent Thais and  37 percent Vietnamese); 29 percent have either social 
sciences, humanities (24 percent Indonesians, 34 percent Malaysians, 30 
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percent Thais and 30 percent Vietnamese) or law or engineering, technology 
and sciences (26 percent  Indonesians, 31 percent Malaysians, 30 percent Thais 
and 28 percent Vietnamese); 8 percent have either literature, education, and 
so on (7 percent  Indonesians, 11 percent Malaysians, 9 percent Thais and 5 
percent Vietnamese). Finally, concerning occupational background, majority 
(49 percent) of the respondents are students. Among those who work, majority 
work in public sector (21 percent), private sector (20 percent). In addition, 9 
percent of respondents are self-employed.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Awareness of ASEAN Regionalism Initiatives
The study argue that it is important to know whether public are aware of the 
economic and political regionalism processes that are occurring in ASEAN 
because awareness may affect public perception and support for the regionalism 
processes. In general, the awareness of APSC and AEC is still weak in four 
countries surveyed.
Awareness of APSC
Majority respondents (in general 54 percent; 66 percent Indonesia; 38 percent 
Malaysia; 56 percent Thailand; 55 percent Vietnam) stated that they have 
knowledge of the APSC. The mean value (3.57) shows the extent of awareness 
for APSC is actually weak as it indicates that in average the public is only 
“somewhat agree” of having awareness on APSC. Using One Way ANOVA 
and Post-Hoc LSD tests, the study found that respondents in Indonesia (mean 
= 3.83) and Vietnam (3.68) seem to have stronger awareness than those in 
Thailand (3.58) and Malaysia (3.19). The Post-Hoc LSD test also shows the 
awareness in Malaysia seems very much weaker than the other three countries. 
Awareness of AEC 
Majority respondents (in general 66 percent; 77 percent Indonesia; 58 percent 
Malaysia; 70 percent Thailand; 58 percent Vietnam) stated that they have 
knowledge of the AEC. The mean value (3.84) shows the extent of awareness 
for AEC is weak as it indicates that in average the public is only “somewhat 
agree” of having awareness of AEC. Using One Way ANOVA and Post-Hoc 
LSD tests, the study found that respondents in Indonesia (mean = 4.05) seem to 
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have stronger awareness than the other three countries, while the Vietnamese 
awareness (3.95) is stronger than those in Thailand (3.81) and Malaysia (3.54). 
The Post-Hoc LSD test also shows the awareness in Malaysia seems very 
much weaker than the other three countries.
The relatively higher awareness in Indonesia can be explained by the 
socialisation of the idea in this country. From some series of FGDs conducted 
in Jakarta in December 2015 to discuss the result of the study, it is indicated 
that the higher awareness in Indonesia maybe resulted from the interaction 
between (central and local) government campaigns and the role of civil societies 
and mass media criticising the lack of preparation strategies from Indonesian 
government. The role of civil societies and mass media in policy making in 
Indonesia become significantly stronger after democratic reforms in 1999 
after the collapse of authoritarian Soeharto administration one year before. 
The issue of Indonesian government’s lackadaisical moves on preparing the 
people was heavily criticised and got coverage from the media. 
PERCEPTION OF ASEAN REGIONALISM INITIATIVES
Perception of ASEAN Political Security
The study argue that it is important to know whether the respondents perceive 
that ASEAN Community as relevant as well as beneficial because it will 
determine the level of support among the public for the regional integration. 
This study includes perceived relevancy and perceived benefits as variable 
measured from the public. Perceived Relevancy indicates the importance of the 
ASEAN liberalisation to the respondent individually as well as to their country 
and its people while perceived benefits identify whether the respondents think 
ASEAN liberalisation will benefit them. Perceptions of the APSC among the 
respondents in four countries are as follow. 
Perceived relevance of APSC for the respondents individually 
Two-thirds respondents in four countries (66 percent; 77 percent Indonesia; 58 
percent Malaysia; 70 percent Thailand; 58 percent Vietnam) stated that APSC 
is “somewhat important” for them individually. The mean value of 3.87 shows 
the extent of perceived relevancy is actually slightly weak. ANOVA’s Post 
Hoc LSD tests find that perception is the highest in Vietnam (mean = 4.16), 
followed by Indonesia (3.97) and Thailand (3.82). The perception in Malaysia 
(3.56) is the lowest among the four countries.  
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Perceived relevance of APSC for the country and people 
Three-fourths respondents in four countries (75 percent; 75 percent Indonesia; 
72 percent Malaysia; 74 percent Thailand; 82 percent Vietnam) stated that 
APSC is “somewhat important” for their country and its people. The mean 
value of 4.09 shows the extent of perceived relevancy is actually slightly weak. 
ANOVA’s Post Hoc LSD tests find that perception is significantly highest in 
Vietnam (mean = 4.41) and lowest in Malaysia (3.86). Perception in Indonesia 
(4.08) and Thailand (4.04) is significantly lower than Vietnam but higher than 
in Malaysia. 
Perceived benefit of APSC for providing more security and peace to the 
region 
More than three-fourths respondents in four countries (76 percent; 79 percent 
Indonesia; 72 percent Malaysia; 71 percent Thailand; 84 percent Vietnam) 
stated that APSC will be beneficial for security and peace of the region. The 
mean value of 4.15 shows the extent of perceived benefit is actually slightly 
weak. ANOVA’s Post Hoc LSD tests find that perception is significantly highest 
in Vietnam (mean = 4.61) and lowest in Malaysia (3.92) and Thailand (3.97). 
Perception in Indonesia (mean = 4.13) is significantly lower than Vietnam but 
higher than in Thailand and Malaysia. 
Perception of ASEAN Economic Community 
Perceptions of the AEC among the respondents in four countries are as follow: 
Perceived relevance of AEC for the respondents personally 
Four-fifths of respondents in four countries (80 percent; 86 percent Indonesia; 
70 percent Malaysia; 81 percent Thailand; 80 percent Vietnam) stated that 
AEC is “somewhat important” for them personally. The mean value of 4.28 
shows the extent of perceived relevancy is actually slightly weak. ANOVA’s 
Post Hoc LSD tests find that perception is the highest in Vietnam (mean = 
4.58), and the lowest in Malaysia (3.96). Perception in Indonesia (4.37) is 
not significantly different with that in Thailand (4.23)—they are significantly 
lower than that in Vietnam but higher than in Malaysia. 
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Perceived relevance of AEC for the country and people 
A very strong majority of respondents (in general 85 percent; 85 percent 
Indonesia and Malaysia; 81 percent Thailand; 88 percent Vietnam) stated that 
AEC is “somewhat important” for their country and its people. The mean 
value of 4.46 shows the extent of perceived relevancy is actually slightly weak. 
ANOVA’s Post Hoc LSD tests find that perception is significantly highest in 
Vietnam (mean = 4.68) and lowest in Indonesia (4.35), Malaysia (4.37) and 
Thailand (4.45). 
Perceived benefit of AEC for bringing economic development of ASEAN 
countries 
A strong majority of respondents (88 percent: 87 percent Indonesia; 91 percent 
Malaysia; 83 percent Thailand; 91 percent Vietnam) stated that AEC will bring 
benefits to economic development of ASEAN countries. The mean value 
of 4.48 shows the extent of perceived benefit is actually in moderate level. 
ANOVA’s Post Hoc LSD tests find that perception is significantly highest in 
Vietnam (mean = 4.68) and lowest in Thailand (4.32).  Perception in Indonesia 
(4.41) and Malaysia (4.52) is significantly lower than Vietnam but higher than 
in Thailand. 
The study found that perceived relevance of APSC as well as the AEC 
for the country and people in general is higher than the relevance for personal 
matters. This phenomena may be explainable by the current mechanism of 
establishing the ASEAN Community that mainly state-centric and elitist. 
Consequently, the public feel a little bit in distance resulting in the lower 
perception of APSC relevance to them personally.
SUPPORT FOR ASEAN REGIONALISM INITIATIVES
Support for the APSC
The study argues that any regionalism initiatives need to be supported by the 
public because support is the foundation of any policies.  Thus, it is important 
to know the level of support among the public for the ASEAN Community.
Nearly three-quarters of respondents (in general 74 percent; 84 percent 
Indonesia; 75 percent Malaysia; 75 percent Thailand; 62 percent Vietnam) 
stated that they supported the establishment of APSC. The mean value (4.12) 
shows the extent of support for APSC is rather weak. Using One Way ANOVA 
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and its Post-Hoc LSD tests, the study found that the support in Indonesia (mean 
= 4.33) is the highest compared in the other three countries, while the support 
in Malaysia (4.01) and Vietnam (3.99) is the lowest. The support in Thailand 
(4.16) is lower than Indonesia but higher than in Malaysia and Vietnam.  
The finding that Indonesia’s support for APSC is the highest among the 
four countries may relate with the history that Indonesia has been the strongest 
promoter of APSC idea since its conception reflected in the Bali Concord 2003. 
Rodolfo Severino (2006) discussed in his book that the Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Hassan Wirayuda promoted the idea of APSC and supported the 
Philippines’ suggestion of ASCC in ASEAN meetings since the end of 2002. 
Severino (2006) discussed how ideas pertaining to economic integration and 
liberalization dominated the discussions of ASEAN integration. He asserts 
that Indonesia strongly advocated the APSC because Indonesia did not want 
economic discussions, particularly on the AEC, become the sole issue of the 
2003 ASEAN Summit. The other reasons for Indonesian active advocacy for 
the idea is because of Indonesia’s security instability in the beginning of 2000s 
with some terrorist activities destabilising this ASEAN largest country, thus 
Indonesia concerned about the flow of arms to Indonesian separatist groups 
from or through neighbouring countries and the lack of coherence of ASEAN’s 
response to global security issues during that period. In addition, Indonesia 
also has seen an opportunity to advance democratic and human rights agenda 
in ASEAN in the context of APSC (Benny 2016b).
Support for the AEC
A strong majority of respondents (in general 87 percent; 90 percent Indonesia; 
89 percent Malaysia; 74 percent Thailand; 94 percent Vietnam) stated that 
they are for the establishment of AEC. The mean value (4.54) shows the extent 
of support for AEC is actually in moderate level.  Using One Way ANOVA 
and its Post-Hoc LSD tests, the study found that the support in Vietnam (mean 
= 4.83) is the highest among the four countries, while the support in Thailand 
(4.26) is the lowest. The support in Indonesia (4.55), not significantly different 
with that in Malaysia (4.53), were lower than Vietnam but higher than in 
Thailand.  
The study’s finding that support for AEC was significantly higher 
in Vietnam than in the other three countries is explainable by Vietnamese 
public’s good perception toward ASEAN in maintain their economic growth. 
Tien Dung Nguyen and Mitsuo Ezaki (2005) argue that ASEAN regional 
economic integration benefits Vietnam’s economy in terms of welfare, income-
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distribution, household consumption and income, greater market access, and 
exports. Analysis on the Vietnam’s exports to ASEAN countries shows that 
the figures increased from USD980.8 million in 1995 to USD18,063.7 million 
in 2015. Its imports from ASEAN countries also increased from USD2,267.2 
million to USD23,827.4 million (ASEAN Secretariat 2006). 
COMPARING AWARENESS, PERCEPTION, SUPPORT FOR APSC 
AND AEC
In achieving the second research objective, Paired-t-Test is used to compare 
the awareness, perception as well as the support for APSC with that of AEC. 
The results of comparison tests are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Comparison of Awareness, Perception and Support for APSC and AEC.
Variable for 




Std. dev. = 1.19
Mean = 3.84
Std. dev. = 1.19
Finding: t = –2.193; df = 1450; Sig 
(2-tailed) = 0.028
Analysis:  Awareness of AEC is 






Std. dev. = 1.17
Mean = 4.27
Std. dev. = 1.08
Finding: t = –12.514; df = 1449;  
Sig (2-tailed) = 0.000
Analysis:  Perceived important of 
AEC is significantly higher than that 
of APSC
Perceived 
relevance for the 
country/people
Mean = 4.08
Std. dev. = 1.07
Mean = 4.45
Std. dev. = 1.01
Finding: t = –11.740; df = 1424;  
Sig (2-tailed) = 0.000
Analysis:  Perceived important of 
AEC is significantly higher than that 
of APSC
Perceived benefits 
from integration / 
cooperation
Mean = 4.15
Std. dev. = 1.11
Mean = 4.48
Std. dev. = 0.95
Finding: t = –10.519; df = 1450;  
Sig (2-tailed) = 0.000
Analysis: Perceived benefit of AEC is 










Std. dev. = 1.01
Finding: t = –12.813; df = 1446;  
Sig (2-tailed) = 0.000
Analysis:  Support for AEC is 
significantly higher than that for 
APSC
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Comparing Awareness of APSC and AEC 
The Paired-t-Test shows that the awareness of AEC (mean = 3.84) in four 
countries is significantly higher than that of the APSC (mean = 3.77). This 
finding is plausible because government in the four ASEAN countries focuses 
more on economic benefits from the integration on their messages when they 
did campaign on the regionalism initiatives to their public.
Comparing Perception of APSC and AEC 
The Paired-t-Test shows that the perceptions of AEC are significantly higher 
than that of APSC. The statistics show that, for personal matters, the perception 
of relevance of AEC (mean = 4.27) is higher than that of APSC (mean = 3.87). 
In addition, the respondents also perceived relevance of the AEC (mean = 
4.45) to their country and people is higher than that of the APSC (mean = 
4.08). Finally, the study also discovers that the respondents’ perception of 
AEC’s benefit (mean = 4.48) is higher than that of APSC (mean = 4.15).
The finding that AEC is considered as more relevant and beneficial for 
them personally and for their country, people and the region is reasonable 
because almost all the countries in ASEAN have followed the model of 
developmental state that focuses more on economic development than political 
matters, so mainstream media discuss mostly about economic development. 
As the results, public are more interested in economic relevance and benefits 
of the ASEAN Community.
Comparing the Support for APSC and AEC 
The Paired-t-Test shows that the support for AEC (mean = 4.54 in four 
countries is significantly higher than that of the APSC (mean = 4.12). The 
proximity of economic issues to the respondents may play a role in the state of 
higher support for AEC in comparison to APSC. In this case, political security 
integration is considered as a more distant issue to the respondents than 
economic integration, resulting in the higher support for AEC than APSC.  
A study by Benny, Moorthy, Daud and Othman (2015a) may explain 
why the support for AEC tends to be higher than APSC. Their study was 
conducted using 2010 public opinion data on the effect of elitist regionalism 
process in ASEAN found the association between elitist, state-centric regional 
integration process in ASEAN and support for its formation. Thus, the study 
argues that, because policy makers in ASEAN tend to consider the issue 
of political security tends as state-domains, the public was less involved in 
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political security decision making than it is on economic regionalism. This 
perception of “distantness” from the public thus may play the role in higher 
support for AEC than it is for APSC.
CONCLUSION
This study analysed the data taken by surveying 1,471 Gen Y respondents in 
four ASEAN countries. The study found that the extent of awareness of both 
APSC and AEC is still weak resulting in weak extent of perceived relevancy 
and benefits as well as weak support for APSC and moderate-level support for 
AEC. Given that previous studies showed the effect of awareness on perception 
and support, the study urges national government to formulate and implement 
the strategy to bring ASEAN economic and political security integration and 
cooperation closer to the public.
Finally, the study found that awareness, perception and support for 
economic integration in ASEAN were stronger than that of political security 
cooperation. The study indicates that the distance of political security issues to 
the public as well as the state-centric APSC process that resulted in the distance 
of political security cooperation to the public. However, successful political 
security cooperation and economic integration requires active participation 
not only from the elites but also from the public. Thus, the study reiterates 
the requirement to bring ASEAN integration to, not only “people-centred 
ASEAN” that is actually very rhetorical, but it should be “people-involved 
ASEAN integration.”
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The research is partially funded by the Ministry of Higher Education Malaysia’s 
Research University Grant (GUP) UKM-GUP-TKS-07-10-96 and the Thai 
Embassy in Kuala Lumpur (UKM-Thai Window Project). The authors would 
like to express their gratitude to the funding agencies.
IJAPS, Vol. 14, No. 1, 227–249, 2018 Guido Benny et al.
245
NOTES
* Guido Benny is a senior lecturer at the School of Liberal Arts, Taylor’s University, 
Malaysia. His research interests include regionalism, ASEAN, public opinions and 
participation in regional integration, and security and economic regionalism and 
cooperation in Southeast and Northeast Asia. He has written some chapters in books 
and many articles in internationally refereed journals. Some of his publications 
include Attitude, Challenges and Aspiration for the ASEAN Community 2015 and 
Beyond: Comparative Public Opinion in Malaysia and Thailand, 2016, The Social 
Sciences 11 (22); Contestation of Regional and National Identities: Effect on Support 
for the Asean Community, 2016, Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 20 (2); 
Perceived Elitist and State-Centric Regional Integration Process: Impact on Public 
Opinions for the Formation of ASEAN Community, 2015, Mediterranean Journal 
of Social Sciences 6 (2); Public Opinion on the Formation of the Asean Economic 
Community: An Exploratory Study in Three ASEAN Countries, 2015, International 
Journal of Asia Pacific Studies 11 (1); and Is the ASEAN Economic Community 
Relevant To Gen Y Professionals? A Comparative Study on Attitudes and Participation 
of Young Professionals in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam on ASEAN Economic, 
2015, The Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research 3 (1).  He can be contacted at 
guidobenny@gmail.com.
**  Sity Daud is Associate Professor of Political Science at the History, Politics and 
Security Centre, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. Her research interest is on East 
Asian political economy, nontraditional security issues, and good governance. She 
has published on development, politics, and human security in Asia Pacific. She is 
also the Deputy President of the Malaysian Social Science Association (PSSM). She 
can be contacted at sitydaud@ukm.edu.my.
*** Ravichandran Moorthy is Associate Professor and Head of the International Relations 
Cluster in the History, Politics and Security Research Centre, Universiti Kebangsaan 
Malaysia. He teaches international relations, ASEAN and Asia Pacific security at the 
university. Prior to his University position, he was a senior officer in the cadre of 
Diplomatic and Administrative Service, in the Malaysian civil service.  He served 
in several positions at the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR), 
Malaysia, the National Institute of Public Administration (INTAN), and as Head of 
Multilateral Division, Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, Malaysia. He 
researches on ASEAN, Indian Ocean geopolitics and environmental security. He has 
lead research projects on Malaysia-Indonesia relations, China’s energy security and 
Mekong River geopolitics. He has been active in several UNESCO working groups 
in the Ethics and Climate Change in Asia and the Pacific (ECCAP) project, and 
was appointed as regional expert for consultation on the revision to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. He was awarded the status of ‘Professor of Honour’ 
by the Institute of East China Sea Rim and Borderland, Zhejiang Normal University, 
China in 2017. In 2014, he was appointed Visiting Professor to the Southeast Asian 
Studies Programme at Puget Sound University, Tacoma, United States. He was also 
appointed consultant to the Timor Leste’s Diplomatic Institute, in the development of 
diplomatic curriculum, where he is also an adjunct professor. He is an adjunct professor 
IJAPS, Vol. 14, No. 1, 227–249, 2018 ASEAN Economic and Political Security
246
at the American University of Sovereign Nations, in the United States. He is often 
consulted by security agencies, embassies and the media on regional geopolitics. His 
publications have appeared in high impact journals like Asian Survey, International 
Relations of the Asia Pacific (IRAP) and Tamkang Journal of International Relations. 
He can be contacted at drravi5774@gmail.com or drravi@ukm.edu.my.
REFERENCES 
Abdullah, K. and Benny, G. 2013. Regional public opinion towards the formation of political 
security community in Southeast Asia. Asian Journal of Scientific Research 6 (4): 
650–665, https://doi.org/10.3923/ajsr.2013.650.665. 
Abidin, Z. A., Loh, G. M. and Aziz, N. I. A. 2012. Achieving the AEC 2012: Challenges for 
the Malaysian private sector. In Achieving the ASEAN economic community 2015, 
ed. Das, S. B., 224–248. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Acharya, A. 2003. Democratisation and the prospects for participatory regionalism in 
Southeast Asia. Third World Quarterly 24 (2): 375–390, https://doi.org/10.1080/01
43659032000074646.
ASEAN Secretariat. 2016. External trade statistics as 10 June 2016. http://asean.org/?static_
post=external-trade-statistics-3 (accessed 4 August 2016).
Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI). 2012. ASEAN 2030: Towards a borderless 
economic community, draft highlights. Tokyo: ADBI. 
Benny, G. 2014. Kesan sentimen nasionalisme terhadap komitmen mengutamakan komuniti 
ekonomi ASEAN: Analisis empirikal daripada survei di Indonesia, Malaysia 
dan Singapura [Effect of nationalism towards commitment to prioritize ASEAN 
Economic Community: Empirical analysis from surveys in Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore]. JEBAT: Malaysian Journal of History, Politics and Strategy 41 (2): 
23–49.
______. 2015. Is the ASEAN economic community relevant to Gen Y professionals? A 
comparative study on attitudes and participation of young professionals in Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and Vietnam on ASEAN economic integration. Asian Journal for Public 
Opinion Research 3 (1): 40–62, https://doi.org/10.15206/ajpor.2015.3.1.40. 
______. 2016a. Contestation of regional and national identities: Effect on support for the 
ASEAN community. Tamkang Journal of International Affairs XX (II): 49–88.
______. 2016b. Attitude, challenges and aspiration for the ASEAN community 2015 and 
beyond: Comparative public opinion in Malaysia and Thailand. The Social Sciences 
11 (22): 5488–5495.
Benny, G. and Abdullah, K. 2011. Indonesian perceptions and attitudes toward the ASEAN 
community. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 30 (1): 39–67. 
Benny, G., Moorthy, R., Daud, S. and Othman, Z. 2015a. Perceived elitist and state-centric 
regional integration process: Impact on public opinions for the formation of ASEAN 
community. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 6 (2): 203–212, https://doi.
org/10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n2s1p203.
______. 2015b. Impact of nationalist sentiments and commitment for prioritising the ASEAN 
economic community: Empirical analysis from survey in Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 6 (1S1): 188–199.
IJAPS, Vol. 14, No. 1, 227–249, 2018 Guido Benny et al.
247
Benny, G., Ramli, R. and Tham, S. Y. 2014. Nationalist sentiments and perceived threats: 
Public opinion in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore and implications to the 
establishment of ASEAN community. Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 
XVIII (I): 59–108.
Benny, G., Tham, S. Y. and Ramli, R. 2015. Public opinion on the formation of the 
ASEAN economic community: An exploratory study in three ASEAN countries. 
International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies 11 (1): 85–114.
Caballero-Anthony, M. 2008. The ASEAN Charter. Southeast Asian Affairs. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Chavez, J. J. 2007. Global social policy forum: Civil society challenging ASEAN. Global 
Social Policy 7 (3): 260–262, https://doi.org/10.1177/14680181070070030204.
Collins, A. 2008. A people-oriented ASEAN: A door ajar or closed for civil society 
organisations? Contemporary Southeast Asia 30 (2): 313–321, https://doi.
org/10.1355/CS30-2G.
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA). 2012. Mid-term review of 
the implementation of AEC Blueprint: Executive summary. Jakarta: ERIA. 
Guerrero, R. B. 2008. Regional integration: The ASEAN vision in 2020. IFC Bulletin 32: 
52–58.
Hew, D. 2007. Brick by brick: The building of an ASEAN Economic Community. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Hewstone, M. 1986. Understanding attitudes to the European community a socio-
psychological study in four member states. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Knoema. 2016. Thailand - Contribution of travel and tourism to GDP as a share of GDP. 
https://knoema.com/atlas/Thailand/topics/Tourism/Travel-and-Tourism-
Total-Contribution-to-GDP/Total-Contribution-to-GDP-percent-share 
(accessed 3 August 2016). 
Lindberg, L. and Scheingold, S. 1970. Europe’s would-be polity. Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Moorthy, R. and Benny, G. 2012a. Attitude towards community building in Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations: A public opinion survey. American Journal of Applied 
Science 9: 557–562, https://doi.org/10.3844/ajassp.2012.557.562.
______. 2012b. Is “ASEAN Community” achievable? A public perception analysis 
in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore on the perceived obstacles for a regional 
community. Asian Survey 52 (6): 1043–1066, https://doi.org/10.1525/
as.2012.52.6.1043.
———. 2013. Does public opinion count? Knowledge and support for an ASEAN 
community in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. International Relations of the 
Asia Pacific 13: 399–423, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lct008.
Mugijayani, W. and Kartika, P. 2012. Perspective of the Indonesian Business Sector on the 
Regional Integration Process. In Achieving the ASEAN Economic Community 2015, 
ed. Das, S. B., 196–223. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Nguyen, T. D. and Ezaki, M. 2005. Regional economic integration and its impacts on 
growth, poverty, and income distribution: The case of Vietnam. Review of Urban 
and Regional Development Studies 17 (3): 197–215, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
940X.2005.00104.x. 
IJAPS, Vol. 14, No. 1, 227–249, 2018 ASEAN Economic and Political Security
248
Ortuoste, M. C. 2008. From an elite- to a people-centred regionalism; from an illiberal peace 
to a human rights regime? The prospect of human rights in Southeast Asia. Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th Annual Convention, Bridging 
Multiple Divides, San Francisco, CA. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/2538_
index.html. 
Severino, R. C. 2006. Southeast Asia in search of an ASEAN community. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Siraprapasiri, P. and Thalang, C. N. 2016. Towards the ASEAN community: Assessing 
the knowledge, attitudes, and aspirations of Thai university students. Journal of 
Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35 (2): 1–35.
Tan, L. H. 2004. Will ASEAN economic integration progress beyond a free trade area? 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 53: 935–967, https://doi.org/10.1093/
iclq/53.4.935.
Thompson, E.C., Thianthai, C. and Thuzar, M. 2016. Do young people know ASEAN? 
Update of a ten-nation survey. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.







I have sufficient knowledge 
about the ASEAN Political 
Security Community.
Completely disagree = 1; Disagree 
= 2; Somewhat disagree = 3; 
Somewhat agree = 4; Agree = 5; 
Completely agree = 6
I have sufficient knowledge 
about the ASEAN Economic 
Community.
Completely disagree = 1; Disagree 
= 2; Somewhat disagree = 3; 
Somewhat agree = 4; Agree = 5; 
Completely agree = 6
Perception of 
APSC and AEC
The APSC is important for my 
country and its people.
Completely disagree = 1; Disagree 
= 2; Somewhat disagree = 3; 
Somewhat agree = 4; Agree = 5; 
Completely agree = 6
The APSC is important for me.
Completely disagree = 1; Disagree 
= 2; Somewhat disagree = 3; 
Somewhat agree = 4; Agree = 5; 
Completely agree = 6
The APSC will provide more 
security and peace to Southeast 
Asia.
Completely disagree = 1; Disagree 
= 2; Somewhat disagree = 3; 
Somewhat agree = 4; Agree = 5; 
Completely agree = 6
The APSC is important for my 
country and its people.
Completely disagree = 1; Disagree 
= 2; Somewhat disagree = 3; 
Somewhat agree = 4; Agree = 5; 
Completely agree = 6
The APSC is important for me.
Completely disagree = 1; Disagree 
= 2; Somewhat disagree = 3; 
Somewhat agree = 4; Agree = 5; 
Completely agree = 6
AEC is a positive development 
for the economies of ASEAN 
countries.
Completely disagree = 1; Disagree 
= 2; Somewhat disagree = 3; 
Somewhat agree = 4; Agree = 5; 
Completely agree = 6
Support for APSC 
and AEC
I am for the establishment of 
ASEAN Political Security 
Community.
Completely disagree = 1; Disagree 
= 2; Somewhat disagree = 3; 
Somewhat agree = 4; Agree = 5; 
Completely agree = 6
I am for the establishment of 
ASEAN Economic Community.
Completely disagree = 1; Disagree 
= 2; Somewhat disagree = 3; 
Somewhat agree = 4; Agree = 5; 
Completely agree = 6
